Can Bangladesh get out of Indian aggression



I. Procedure:

I.1. The complainant (hereinafter: BF), a citizen of Bangladesh, filed the relevant application for international protection on February 7, 2017.

As part of an initial written survey conducted on the same day in front of an organ of the public security service, the BF stated, when asked about his reason for fleeing, that at the end of 2012, as a sympathizer of the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (hereinafter: BNP), members of the ruling Awami League party attacked and attacked him in his home country to have been badly injured. He suffered several cuts, including a vertical cut on his left upper arm and left shoulder. For these reasons, he was afraid for his life and had tried to leave his home since 2012, but only succeeded in January 2017. In his home country, he was also falsely reported by his opponents under criminal law. The report was reported on October 9, 2017 in the police station XXXX. The police wanted the BF on January 10, 2017. In the event of a return, he feared for his life.

I.2. On June 27, 2018, the BF was questioned in writing before the Federal Office for Immigration and Asylum (hereinafter: BFA).

At the beginning, the BF stated that he was healthy and did not take any medication and submitted a confirmation of membership from the Bangladesh Austria Association as well as two initial information reports, two indictments and two arrest warrants, both in the original and in English translation, as well as a letter from a lawyer in Bengali and English . In relation to the first indictment presented, he stated that a police car had been attacked at a bus station in 2015 and the BF had been reported for damage to property; Regarding the second charge submitted, the BF stated that a student had died in the course of a fight in connection with a board game in a small bazaar and the BF was listed as the suspect.

In its questioning, the BF essentially stated that he had always been afraid of being arrested in Bangladesh because his neighbor was a mayor and a supporter of the Awami League. Neither the BF nor family members of the BF were politically active, but the BF was a sympathizer of the BNP.

When asked specifically about his reason for fleeing, he stated in summary that the BF had regularly drunk tea at a bus station with a BNP party member, whose brother XXXX had won the election. The neighbor of the BF, who is mayor, had a dispute with his brother. One day in April or May 2012, when the BF drove home in a rickshaw from the gas station, five to six people came on the main street and carried out an attack on the BF. The rickshaw driver received four to five slaps in the face and the BF was pulled by the rickshaw, verbally abused and beaten with his fists. The BF was accused of being from the BNP, which the BF denied. He was told that they had evidence and saw how the BF had amused himself with XXXX's brother. Due to the blows, the BF's humerus was displaced so that he no longer had any strength in his left arm. His left collarbone was broken with a metal rod and before that, his biceps and shoulder were injured with a knife. The BF had passed out and only woke up again when he was treated by a doctor. He was asked by whom he was injured, but the BF could not say because he did not know the people. Then he spoke to a police officer at the police station and wanted to have an entry in the General Diary. The police officer said to the BF that he should ask the mayor beforehand so that he could call the police commander of the police station and give him permission to do so. The mayor is a relative of the extended family of the BF. Ultimately, the entry in the General Diary was not made. Then the BF tried to go abroad.

The BF's family is doing badly depending on the situation. His wife is seriously ill.

When asked what the BF had done after the attack up to his escape, he stated that the doctor had told him not to do anything. The BF's family did not have poor farming practices. The BF thought that he would stay at home and buy a cattle for breeding. A neighbor of the BF had organized the departure of the BF. For one of the neighbors' vehicles, the BF agreed to work as a partner with the neighbor. The vehicle transported chickens.

When asked when the BF found out about the advertisements, he stated that he heard about them in his home country. The murder and the damage to property happened at the bus station in his home village.

When asked why the BF had just fled on January 10, 2017, he stated that the police had come to the mayor's house in the neighborhood as usual, and that night the police had come to the BF's home to look for him . At that time, the BF had just got off at the gas station in Hauptstrasse when he came back from XXXX.

I.3. On September 16, 2019, the BF conducted another survey in front of the BFA, in which the BF submitted further documents, including the Special Authorization Act 1974, the Digital Security Act of October 2018, the Bangladesh Human Rights Report 2018 by the human rights organization XXXX and Internet extracts, and submitted an application , which was translated by the interpreter to the effect that the BF was being prosecuted as a political opponent and that politically motivated criminal proceedings were attached to him, which is why he applied for the BF to investigate on the spot.

In addition, the BF essentially stated in its survey that it had received the submitted reports from a friend named XXXX and that he had had the documents sent to the BF via XXXX. This friend went to the public negotiations and obtained the documents for the BF. The BF was very good friends with this friend; this one would live in XXXX. The BF had phoned him the week before about a third criminal case against the BF. In the third complaint, the BF was accused of bodily harm, damage to property, unlawful gathering and resistance to state power. These are the typical allegations of a political process. The third advertisement is from December 18, 2018.

When asked why the BF had been able to live in Bangladesh for so long even though he had been persecuted since 2012, the BF stated that he had sometimes been in the city of XXXX and that he sometimes stayed in hiding until he left the country .

His mother, three brothers, the BF's wife and daughter would still live in the hometown. The BF does not have good contact with his relatives. His wife married the BF according to Islamic rules, but she divorced the BF according to religious rules and is living with her parents again. The BF only has contact with his daughter, who lives with different aunts. The BF's mother is not doing well. The BF's family was disturbed by house searches in Bangladesh because criminal proceedings were ongoing against the BF. The BF's mother is mocked by those in power in the village.

In the first two criminal proceedings there was already a conviction, which is why the BF would die immediately if he returned, and because the third criminal case had been initiated against the BF, the police would conduct house searches. The BF learned this from a friend named XXXX, who lives in the neighborhood.

When asked, the BF added that he had once been sentenced to life imprisonment and once the death penalty was imposed on the BF.

Alleged that no life imprisonment was imposed for damage to property, the BF stated that it was not just damage to property, but unlawful gathering, arson, property damage and resistance to state power. These are the usual facts against opposition members.

Alleged that the BF was accused in the first complaint of causing disturbance and violating the Security Ordinance Violation Act and that the arrest warrant resulted because the BF had not appeared in court, the BF stated that he would be arrested precisely because of these things. Many people who the police had not brought before the court could not be found. While he was still in Bangladesh, the BF had noticed that two perpetrators of these incidents had been taken straight away, but had never been brought before the court. They never came home because they were secretly killed. Against the opposition, this happens through and through across the country. However, the BF does not know the names of these people.

When asked whether the BF was present at the incident relating to the second report, he stated that he was not present. On 10/10/2018 there was an argument in which a person named XXXX was seriously injured with a cleaver. The BF then found out that he had died in the hospital and that the BF was reported as a suspect because he belonged to the opposing party.

When asked specifically what function the BF had in the BNP, he stated that he had been very close to the leader of the BNP at the police administration level, XXXX, and his brother. Even if the BF had no function, it had a great reputation as a member. The BF no longer has any contact with XXXX XXXX XXXX, which is why he does not know where he is currently located. But he heard from the news that he had given a lecture during a party rally and had been attacked. He suffered serious injuries and had to be hospitalized. You can read about this on the Internet.

When asked whether the BF had an upright family life in Austria, he answered in the affirmative and stated that he had a family-like relationship with XXXX, an Austrian national. When asked, he stated that he had a sexual relationship with this person. The BF does not live in a common household with this person and only meets with him from time to time. The BF has no duty of care. When asked, the BF stated that he was also attracted to women.

At the end of the survey, the BF added to his submission that he also had problems with Facebook entries.

I.4. With the now contested decision of September 27, 2019, the BFA rejected the BF's application for international protection in accordance with Section 3 (1) in conjunction with Section 2 (1) no.13 AsylG 2005 regarding the granting of the status of person entitled to asylum (point I.) 8 para. 1 in conjunction with § 2 para. 1 no. 13 AsylG 2005 with regard to the granting of the status of beneficiary of subsidiary protection in relation to the country of origin Bangladesh (point II.). The BF was not granted a residence permit for reasons worthy of consideration in accordance with Section 57 AsylG 2005 (point III.). In accordance with Section 10 (1) no.3 AsylG 2005 in conjunction with Section 9 BFA-VG, a return decision was issued against the BF in accordance with Section 52 (2) 2 FPG (point IV.). In addition, pursuant to Section 52 (9) FPG, it was determined that deportation to Bangladesh was permissible pursuant to Section 46 FPG (ruling point V.) and it was stated that, pursuant to Section 55 (1 to 3) FPG, the deadline for voluntary departure was 14 days The return decision is legally binding (point VI.).

The reasoning was essentially that the authenticity of the submitted notifications was heavily questioned, in particular due to the BF's incomplete name, and that the BF had increased its allegations of escape significantly in the course of the proceedings, which is why the BF's submission was assumed to be untrustworthy. Based on the information provided by the BF, it is also assumed that it could survive in Bangladesh. The BF has a solid school education and can count on the support of his family members living in Bangladesh. The prerequisites for the granting of a "special protection residence permit" would not be met and, moreover, the public interests in an orderly enforcement of foreign affairs would outweigh the BF's private interests in remaining in the federal territory, which is why a return decision had to be issued. The deportation of the BF was to be assessed as permissible.

I.5. On October 17, 2019, the decision of the BFA was contested in its entirety by the BF - represented by the XXXX.

Substantially inadequate state determinations on the situation of opposition members, court proceedings, conditions of detention and the general security situation as well as inadequate investigations into the evidence submitted were asserted.

With regard to the evidence presented, the BFA should have carried out an investigation, as it is not sufficient to rely on the country reports, which state that such documents are often forged.

With regard to the assessment of the evidence, the authority is to be further accused of failing to question the BF comprehensively and in detail in connection with the third complaint. The BF could have stated that his family was subsequently visited and threatened by the police in Bangladesh. The BF deleted the triggering comments on Facebook and deactivated the service for fear of persecution. In this comment, the BF pointed to corruption and unlawful elections.

The objection to the increase in his submissions in relation to the submission regarding sexual contact with a man is countered by the fact that it cannot be seen how an applicant can increase his submissions in the context of the first-instance proceedings.

The BF is being persecuted in Bangladesh because of his political views. In addition, the BF also faces persecution because of the affiliation of the men who are accused of homosexual acts, should his sexual contact with a man emerge.

I.6. On October 31, 2019, the BFA submitted the complaint and the act of the administrative procedure to the Federal Administrative Court for decision.

I.7. With the summons to the hearing before the Federal Administrative Court, the current country information sheet (April 2020) of the state documentation on Bangladesh was sent for any comments up to at the latest within the framework of the oral complaint hearing scheduled for June 2nd, 2020.

On June 2nd, 2020, the Federal Administrative Court held a public oral complaint hearing in the presence of an interpreter for the Bengali language, in which the BF and his legal representative took part. In the course of the negotiation, the BF was again questioned extensively, among other things, about his reasons for fleeing, his fears of return, his family circumstances and his living conditions in Bangladesh.

When asked whether the BF had any contact with his family in Bangladesh, he said: “With my family, you could say not really”. Only after the third question did the BF say, "Yes, sometimes". When asked how often, the BF stated: "Last month, for example, 2 times because my younger brother is sick, that's why."

When asked who his family was, the BF said: "My mother, 2 brothers, the brother's wife and the daughter." In the course of further questioning it turned out that the BF had 3 brothers, 4 sisters, one wife and one Daughter has. His mother is still alive, the father has died.

The wife went to his father-in-law and left the BF, but they were still legally married. The daughter, born on October 26th, 2001, alternately lives with the sisters.

The attempt to have a conversation in German with the BF during the negotiation failed; The BF did not understand most of the (simple) questions, and the language vocabulary is very limited. The BF has not yet obtained a language certificate because, in his opinion, he is a little psychologically depressed due to the family circumstances and difficulties. Due to the lock-down (mid-March 2020) in connection with the corona virus, it was not possible to complete a German course.

The BF has been in Austria since February 6, 2017.

When asked whether he had children in Austria, the BF said no. When asked whether he was in a relationship in Austria, the BF said: "No, not at the moment."

When asked by the representative of the BF that he had stated to the BFA that he had had a relationship with a man, the BF replied that he had met a man on Karlsplatz in Vienna with whom he had had homosexual contact. They met at a party and had a drink together. They would have met 4 to 5 times. After the display on the BF's mobile phone broke, he could no longer call the friend; he saw him again later, but did not make any contact.

When asked by the TP, the BF said that he felt he was a homosexual man. He did not seek a connection to the homosexual scene in Austria, nor did he have any further contact. The BF had not spoken to anyone about his homosexual experience, with the exception of the BFA.

He currently lives through Caritas. He lives with three others in an apartment. He mostly cooks, meets with a Bengali in Heiligenstadt or another friend in Meidling. He tries to read newspapers. He doesn't have a TV, and only has internet access through his roommates. He used to have a mobile phone with Facebook functionality, but the display broke and he had to get a mobile phone with a prepaid card. A Bengali friend helped him with the preparation of the documents for his procedure.

In Bangladesh, after school, the BF first helped on the agricultural property, then he did the "bus work".

He left Bangladesh on January 12, 2017. Two days earlier, the police had come to his home with an arrest warrant while the BF was still working at the gas station. He then no longer went home, but went straight to his sister in XXXX. He borrowed money from his brother-in-law and drove to XXXX, from there to India (Calcutta, later Delhi).

The first political incident against the BF happened in mid-2012 when the BF was on his way home in a rickshaw. He was dragged out of the rickshaw, seriously injured and knocked unconscious, and other people rushed to help and took him to a doctor. The BF was certain that the attackers were members of the AL. This is because the BF had participated in a BNP event about five days earlier. 3000 to 4000 people took part in this event. Then, about two to three days before the attack, people at the bus stand mocked and blasphemed him about why the BF was so supportive of the BNP leader.

The police were looking for him on January 10, 2017 because of an incident that should have occurred on August 26, 2015. It was an incident at the bus station. The BF was sitting in a tea shop, about half a kilometer away from a bazaar near the school college. A demonstration took place there with around 50 to 70 people. The BF noticed that 2 police vehicles had been damaged and the police officers also arrested 2 to 3 people. He would have been charged as the third person in the criminal proceedings. This is because the demonstration was made by BNP activists and because the BF also likes the BNP. The BF had only been at the bus stand to drink tea, he had not even been to the incident.

The first complaint (demonstration near the bus station) against the BF was brought in on August 27, 2015 about the incident on August 26, 2015. That's why the police wanted to arrest him on January 10, 2017. The BF then went into hiding, for example took the bus to XXXX, XXXX and XXXX; sometimes he slept in the vehicle.

The second ad is from 10/10/2015. In the neighboring village, a person named XXXX was injured during a game of Karambot due to an argument and then died in the hospital. These were people from the AL, the BF already knew this from the town, and the BF would have been faked as the perpetrator in the complaint.

The BF did not know anything about the third complaint, a friend told him about it. In an incident on December 18, 2018, at a time when the BF was already in Austria, there would have been a fight of 20 to 30 people in the police administrative district XXXX between supporters of the AL and the BNP, and the BF would have been in this Be mentioned in the advertisement.

The BF had to be asked three times during the hearing whether the BF was a member of a party before he replied - without disguising debauchery -: "No, I wasn't a member by name, but I knew everyone up to the level of the police administrative district." BF had to admit that he also knew people from the opposing AL in the village, because the AL were also represented in the village. These people were not deep friends, with whom he was not on the road.

Another reason for fleeing was not given.

II. The Federal Administrative Court has considered:

II.1. Findings:

II.1.1. About the BF:

The adult BF is a citizen of Bangladesh and belongs to the Muslim religious community. His mother tongue is Bengali.

The BF attended a primary school in his hometown in District XXXX in Bangladesh for nine years. After that, the BF was a vehicle assistant ("bus work") for a relative and helped out with the family's farm. The BF lived in District XXXX but stayed regularly in XXXX, where he stayed with his sister.

The BF got married in Bangladesh, the BF's wife separated from the BF; Formally, no divorce has yet been declared. The mother, the three brothers, the four sisters, the (ex) wife and the daughter of the BF live in Bangladesh. The BF's father died in 2016 after a heart attack. The BF is in contact with his mother and daughter in Bangladesh. The family members of the BF finance their living in Bangladesh through the family's rice fields and (previously) the financial support of the in-laws of the BF.

On February 7, 2017, the BF submitted the asylum application in question. The BF receives benefits from the state basic supply and lives together with three Bengali nationals in a private apartment. The BF is a member of XXXX. He has registered for an A1 German course, but has not yet taken an exam.

There are no family members of the BF in Germany.

The BF claimed to have had a homosexual relationship before the BFA, but is also attracted to women. Before the BVwG, the BF denied that he currently had a relationship. He would have had contact with a homosexual man 4 to 5 times, he feels like a homosexual, but is not looking for any contact with the homosexual scene in Austria and has not told anyone about it - apart from the BFA and the BVwG.

The BF is criminally innocent.

The BF is fit for work and healthy.

II.1.2. On the escape submission by the BF:

It is found that the BF only made constant, repeated inquiries with details on the alleged incidents and thus reduced the credibility of his statements, because the incidents appeared to be constructed.

The BF is not a member of any party, not even the BNP.

It is stated that it is not credible if the BF was dragged out of a rickshaw and beaten by "presumably" AL members at a BNP event in which 3,000 to 4,000 people took part, one week afterwards, although he was not even beaten Is a party member of the BNP.

It is determined that it is unbelievable that a police operation took place against the BF in January 2017 because of an incident from August 2015. The descriptions of this incident, such as the "arrest" of two to three people from a crowd of 50 to 70 demonstrators, which the BF claims to have noticed from a distance of half a kilometer, are also not credible.

It is established that the second alleged incident of October 10, 2015, namely an argument with a fatal outcome in a Karambot game in the neighboring village, is said to have led to a complaint against the BF, because this argument was also a conflict between AL and BNP Members is unbelievable because the BF was not even a member of the BNP and, according to his statements, was not at the crime scene.

It is established that the third complaint against the BF from December 18, 2018 because of the involvement in a brawl between 20 to 30 people in Dorf XXXX Police Administration District XXXX is a false report because the BF can be shown to have been in Austria at that time.

It is thus established that in Bangladesh no complaints were made against the BF, arrest warrants were issued against the BF or judgments were made against the BF.

Nor is it established that the police wanted or is wanted by the police in Bangladesh.

The BF has not been exposed to any threats or persecution specifically directed against him for political or homosexual reasons in his country of origin and is also not threatened with persecution in the event of his return.

In addition to the alleged risk of persecution for political or homosexual reasons, there are no other reasons on the basis of which the BF would have to fear persecution or danger in his home country. In particular, it could not be ascertained that the BF was threatened with persecution in Bangladesh because of his homosexuality, which he experienced in Austria, because, according to his own statement, the BF only expressed this to the BFA and the BVwG, so that there is no knowledge of this in his home country.

II.1.3. Regarding the relevant situation in Bangladesh:

1. Political situation

Last change: April 6th, 2020

Bangladesh - official name People's Republic of Bangladesh (Gaṇaprajātantrī Bāṃlādeś) has been a parliamentary democracy since 1991 (GIZ 11.2019a). Most of the country is located in the delta plain formed by the confluence of the Ganges and Brahmaputra rivers in the Bay of Bengal (Indian Ocean). Neighboring states are India (west, north and east) and Myanmar (southeast). The capital is Dhaka (approx. 20 million inhabitants). About 163 million people live in an area of ​​approx. 148,000 km² (CIA March 13, 2020) (CIA March 13, 2020; cf. GIZ 3.2020, AA 6.3.2020a). With 1,127 inhabitants per square kilometer, Bangladesh is the most densely populated country in the world (for comparison: Austria 104 inhabitants per km²) (WPR undated; cf. AA 6.3.2020a).

The head of state is the president, who is elected by parliament every five years. A one-time re-election is possible. He performs mostly ceremonial functions, while power rests in the hands of the prime minister as head of government. This is nominated by the strongest party represented in parliament and formally appointed by the president. The Prime Minister appoints the members of the government who are confirmed by the President. After the end of the five-year legislative period, the President forms an independent transitional government under his leadership, whose constitutional task is to create the conditions for new elections within 90 days (ÖB 8.2019; see GIZ 11.2019a). In addition, the Prime Minister is responsible for overseeing the secret services, the armed forces and the paramilitary units (GIZ 11.2019a).

The parliament (National Parliament or Jatiya Sangsad) consists of a chamber with 300 members directly elected in individual constituencies for five years (ÖB 8.2019) with an additional 50 seats reserved for women only (USDOS 11.3.2020; see GIZ 11.2019 a). These are not awarded directly through an election, but are nominated by the parties that make it into parliament (GIZ 11.2019a; see USDOS 11.3.2020). Parliament does not sit during the term of office of the transitional government. The majority vote leads to stable majorities in parliament and has favored the emergence of the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) and the Awami League (AL) as dominant and competing parties. While the conservative BNP has allies in the Islamist parties such as the Jamaat-e-Islami (JI), the AL traditionally receives support from left and secular parties such as the Labor Party, the Liberal Democratic Party, the national-social party Jatiyo Samajtantrik Dal and more recently also from the Jatiya party, under the former military dictator Hossain Mohammad Ershad (ÖB 8.2019).

Political life is determined by the two dominant and competing largest parties, the “Awami League” (AL) and the “Bangladesh Nationalist Party” (BNP) (ÖB 8.2019). Clientelism and corruption are widespread. Trade unions, student organizations, police and administration are permeated by party politics (AA July 22, 2019; cf. DGVN 2016). Both parties do not have a democratic internal structure and are led by families who have shaped Bangladesh since independence (FH 2020).

Sheikh Hasina Wazed of the Awami League (AL) has been Prime Minister since 2009 (GIZ 11.2019a; see ÖB 8.2019). In January 2019, Sheikh Hasina was sworn in as Prime Minister for her fourth term, the third term in a row. In February 2019 she announced that she wanted to hand over to the "young generation" after this term of office (DW 14.2.2019).

In the eleventh Bangladeshi parliamentary elections on December 30, 2018, the "Great Alliance" around the ruling AL achieved a landslide victory with 96% of the votes and 289 of the 300 parliamentary seats available for election (Guardian December 30, 2018; cf. BN24 December 31, 2018, DT 27.1. 2019, DS 10.1.2019, DW 14.2.2019), whereby by-elections were necessary in two constituencies due to violence (DS 10.1.2019) or the death of a candidate (DT 27.1.2019).

There are reports of election rigging. The opposition condemned the election as a “farce” and called for the results to be canceled and for new elections to be held. The ruling party rejects the manipulation allegations and calls for new elections and calls the election “completely free and independent” (BBC December 31, 2018). In a preliminary assessment, election observers from the SAARC (South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation) stated that the election was "much freer and fairer" than the previous one (Hindu 1.1.2019). Even in the run-up to the election, there was violence between rival supporters and the government's crackdowns were too harsh (BBC December 31, 2018; cf. The elections on December 30, 2018 were characterized by attacks on members of the opposition, arbitrary arrests and intimidation of those entitled to vote (HRW January 14, 2020). On election day, around 600,000 security forces, including the army and paramilitary troops, were deployed to contain the violence (Guardian 12/30/2018). The election was declared free and fair early on by the election commission. Irregularities were not investigated. Instead, journalists were arrested for their reporting (HRW 14.1.2020). At least 17 people were killed in clashes between supporters of the ruling party and the opposition (Reuters 01/01/2019).

Due to its strong social roots, the opposition BNP has the potential to generate great extra-parliamentary pressure through general strikes (GIZ 11.2019a).

Due to the dominance of the AL and the lack of internal party democracy, the executive top de facto has the exclusive say in draft laws. Like the previous governments, the current AL government is expanding its networks in administration, law and the military. To make matters worse, the BNP, formerly the largest opposition party, had contested the election result and is no longer represented in parliament (GIZ 11.2019a).

The first constitution came into force in 1972 and set secularism, socialism and nationalism as goals in addition to the democratic form of government. After numerous constitutional changes, Islam was introduced as the state religion in 1988 while at the same time the right to peaceful exercise of other religions was anchored in the constitution (ÖB 8.2019). The constitution-changing majority of the AL in parliament leads to an enormous concentration of power. Legislative initiatives further restrict the scope of civil society (ACCORD 12.2016). The announcement by PM Sheik Hasina that a tribunal would be set up to hold those responsible for the war crimes in the War of Independence in 1971, but also for the murder of her father and state founder Sheikh Rajibur Rahman in 1975 and attempted assassinations on her own life in 2004, to account certain (pro-Pakistani circles) in Bangladesh to fierce resistance (ÖB 8.2019).

The local elections in 2019 took place on five different election days between 10.3. and 18.6.2019 (bdnews24 20.6.2019; see bdnews24 3.2.2019). After the BNP and some other parties boycotted the elections, a low turnout was observed (bdnews24 June 20, 2019; see DS March 10, 2019). The AL candidates were victorious in 317 out of 470 Upazillas [counties], and in 149 Upazillas independent candidates who are predominantly renegades from the ruling parties won. There were no opposing candidates in 115 Upazillas (bdnews 20.6.2019). However, the BNP announced that it would participate in the by-elections in a total of 8 Upazillas on October 14, 2019 (PA September 8, 2019).

The administrative structure of Bangladesh is centralized: The country is divided into eight regions (divisions), 64 districts (districts), 92 districts orLarge cities (Upazilas / City Corporations), over 4,500 community associations (Union Councils / Municipalities) and around 87,000 village communities (ÖB 8.2019). In the area of ​​the Chittagong Hill Tracts, a special administration applies, which is intended to give the local (indigenous), non-Bengali population increased opportunities to participate (ÖB 8.2019).


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 Reuters (1.1.2019): Western powers call for probe into Bangladesh election irregularities, violence, bangladesh-election-irregularities-violence-idUSKCN1OV1PK, accessed 6.4.2020

 HRW - Human Rights Watch (December 13, 2018): Bangladesh: Crackdown as Elections Loom,, accessed April 6, 2020

 USDOS - US Department of State (March 11, 2020): Country Report on Human Rights Practices 2019 - Bangladesh,, accessed March 24, 2020

 WPR - World Population Review (undated): World Countries by Population Density 2020, Accessed April 6, 2020

2. Security situation

Last change: April 6th, 2020

The hatred between political parties, especially the Awami League (AL) and the Bangladesh National Party (BNP), is responsible for most of the violence in the country (ACLED 11/9/2018). The ruling Awami League (AL) has expanded its political power through persistent intimidation of the opposition, as well as those forces allied with it, as well as the critical media and voices in civil society (FH 2020). Both parties - together with unidentified armed groups - are involved in vandalism and violent clashes and also attack peaceful civilians (ACLED 11/9/2018).

Violence continues in many cases from non-state actors (especially the opposition, Islamists, students). Public security is fragile. The state monopoly on the use of force is broken. There are often murders and violent clashes due to political (including intra-party) or criminal rivalries. An explanation is rarely given. The big parties have their own “student organizations”. With the tacit consent of the mother parties, these armed organizations act as their shield and sword. Your involvement in the political process is one of the most important causes of political violence in Bangladesh (AA July 22, 2019).

Spontaneous strikes and rallies can take place at any time (BMEIA March 18, 2020; see AA March 22, 2020), fighting between security authorities and demonstrators, arson, violence and vandalism can occur unexpectedly (UKFCO March 29, 2020a).

Violence against civilians or state forces by rebels makes up a relatively small proportion of all violent events. There are radical Islamist groups like the Mujahideen Bangladesh (JMB) and Ansarullah Bangla Team (ABT). Both the Islamic State (IS) and Al Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS) state that they are active in Bangladesh, but the government denies this (ACLED 11/9/2018). In 2017 there were five fatal suicide attacks, which the Islamic State claimed (BMEIA March 18, 2020; see SATP April 2, 2020). In 2019 there were several attacks against police and security forces in Dhaka and in the city of Khulna. On February 29, 2020, there was an attack on the police in Chittagong, in which improvised explosive devices (IEDs) were also used. The Bangladeshi authorities remain on high alert and thwart planned attacks. A number of arrests have been made. Some operations against suspected militants have also resulted in deaths (UKFCO March 29, 2020b). Extremist groups carry out attacks on members of vulnerable groups (USDOS March 11, 2020; AA July 27, 2019). In many cases it is not possible to clearly differentiate whether religious motives or secular interests, such as acts of revenge or land grabbing, are the reason for the incidents. Security authorities sometimes do not react promptly or not at all to religiously motivated incidents (AA July 22, 2019).

In the Chittagong division, especially in the area of ​​the Chittagong Hill Tracts (districts Rangamati, Khagrachari and Bandarban), there are armed unrest and criminal attacks (AA March 22, 2020; see UKFCO March 29, 2020a, AI January 30, 2020). In the southeastern administrative district of Cox’s Bazar of the Chittagong area administration, there have recently been isolated violent incidents near refugee camps, among other places. There are reports of security problems, protest rallies as well as acts of violence and unrest both among the local population and among the residents of the camps after a local political leader has been murdered (HRW September 18, 2019; see AA November 5, 2019, TDS August 24, 2019) .

In March 2019, several election and security officials were killed in the local elections in the Baghicahhari area in the north of Rangamati district (UKFCO March 29, 2020a).

On the border with India, there are occasional exchanges of fire between Indian and Bangladeshi border guards. People who try to cross the border illegally are regularly killed (UKFCO March 29, 2020a).

The South Asia Terrorism Portal recorded a total of 907 deaths from violence related to terrorism in 2016. In 2017, 812 people were killed by terrorist violence and in 2018 940 people were killed by acts of terrorism. In 2019, the number of victims of terrorism-related violence nationwide totaled 621 deaths. As of March 5, 2020, 81 deaths were registered as a result of the use of terrorist violence [Note: the figures quoted include civilians, security forces and terrorists] (SATP March 17, 2020).

The South Asia Terrorism Portal recorded a total of 263 incidents of terrorism-related violence in 2017. There were 135 such incidents in 2018 and 104 incidents in 2019. As of April 2nd, 2020, 29 incidents of terrorist use of violence were registered (SATP April 2nd, 2020).

In the monsoon season from mid-June to mid-October, floods must be expected, in the southern third of the country from October to November and mid-April to mid-May, generally also with cyclones (AA March 22, 2020). Regularly recurring floods and the erosion of river banks lead to extensive internal migration (AA July 22, 2019; cf. Kaipel 2018). Crime is high, especially robbery (BMEIA March 18, 2020).


 AA - Foreign Office of the Federal Republic of Germany (March 22, 2020): Bangladesh: Travel and Security Advice,, access 2.4. 2020

 AA - Foreign Office (Germany) (July 22, 2019): Foreign Office, report on the asylum and deportation-relevant situation in the People's Republic of Bangladesh, C3% A4rtiges_Amt% 2C_Bericht_% C3% Bcber_the_asylum_and_deportation-relevant_Lage_in_der_People_Republic_Bangladesch_% 28Stand_Mai_2019% 29% 2C_22.07.2019.pdf, accessed 19.3.2020

 ACLED - Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (November 9, 2018): The Anatomy of Violence in Bangladesh, /, Accessed on March 6, 2019

 AA - Anadolu Agency (November 5, 2019): Bangladesh rejects Amnesty report on Rohingya killings, / 1636457, accessed on April 2, 2020

 AI - Amnesty International (January 30, 2020): Human Rights in Asia-Pacific; Review of 2019 - Bangladesh,, accessed on April 2, 2020

 BMEIA - Federal Ministry for Europe, Integration and Foreign Affairs (March 18, 2020): Bangladesh - travel information,, accessed April 2, 2020

 FH - Freedom House (2020): Freedom in the World 2020 - Bangladesh,, accessed on April 1, 2020

 HRW - Human Rights Watch (September 18, 2019):

Spate of Bangladesh ‘Crossfire’ Killings of Rohingya,, accessed on February 4, 2020

 Kaipel, Simione Christina (2018): “Global change - regional crises? Ecological and socio-economic perspectives on environmentally-related migration flows ”, Master's thesis, pages 41 - 54,, accessed on 2.4.2020

 SATP - South Asia Terrorism Portal (2.4.2020): Data Sheet - Bangladesh,

Number of Terrorism Related Incidents Year Wise 2000 - 2020,, accessed 6.4.2020

 SATP - South Asia Terrorism Portal (2.4.2020): Data Sheet - Bangladesh,

Yearly Sucide Attacks, Advance Search 2000 - 2020,, accessed 6.4.2020

 TDS - The Daily Star (August 24, 2019): Jubo League leader killed by 'Rohingyas',, accessed January 15. 2020

 UKFCO - UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office (6.9.201929.3.2020a): Foreign travel advice Bangladesh - Safety and security,, access 4.2.2020

 UKFCO - UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office (6.9.201929.3.2020b): Foreign travel advice Bangladesh - Terrorism,, accessed 4.2.2020

 USDOS - US Department of State (March 11, 2020): Country Report on Human Rights Practices 2019 - Bangladesh,, accessed March 24, 2020

3. Legal protection / judicial system

Last change: April 6th, 2020

The court system consists of two instances, the lower courts (Magistrates, Session and District Judges) and the Supreme Court. Both negotiate civil and criminal cases. The legal system is largely based on English common law. The Supreme Court consists of two departments, the “High Court”, which hears constitutional questions and acts as an appeal body to the courts of first instance, and the “Appellate Court”, whose decisions are binding on all other courts. The judges of both departments are appointed by the president in accordance with the constitution (ÖB 8.2019).

The independence of judges is guaranteed by the constitution. In practice, however, a long-standing temporary provision of the constitution assumes the first instance judges of the executive branch. Their appointment and remuneration are also a matter for the executive. In contrast, the judges of the Supreme Court have repeatedly demonstrated their independence and ruled against the government (ÖB 8.2019). According to a constitutional amendment, judges can be removed from office (AA July 22, 2019).

On the basis of several laws (“Public Safety Act”, “Law and Order Disruption Crimes Speedy Trial Act”, “Women and Children Repression Prevention Act”, “Special Powers Act”) special tribunals have been set up that have to deal with cases within a set time frame. However, there are no provisions in the event that they fail to comply with this obligation. According to media reports, these "Speedy Trial" tribunals have sentenced several hundred people to death in recent years (ÖB 8.2019).

As most observers from Bangladesh agree, corruption, inefficiency of the judiciary, targeted violence against judges and a huge backlog of open cases are major problems (ÖB 8.2019; cf. FH 2020). Criminal charges against members of the ruling party are regularly withdrawn (FH 2020). The sheer number of lawsuits brought against the political opposition in the run-up to the 11th parliamentary election on December 30, 2018, indicates an unhindered playing field and the control of the ruling party over the judicial and security institutions (FIDH December 29, 2018).

Two thirds of all disputes do not reach the formal justice system, but are decided by informal village courts or important figures in the local community. These mostly deal with cases relating to family law, alimony, second marriages, dowry disputes and land ownership.Although these “courts” represent a faster and cheaper alternative to ordinary courts legitimized by tradition, they are not without problems with regard to the influence of locally important personalities as well as the social position of women. The Islamic Sharia is not formally introduced as a law, but it plays a major role in the areas of civil law (inheritance, land acquisition, marriage and divorce, etc.) (ÖB 8.2019).


 AA - Foreign Office (Germany) (July 22, 2019): Foreign Office, report on the asylum and deportation-relevant situation in the People's Republic of Bangladesh, C3% A4rtiges_Amt% 2C_Bericht_% C3% Bcber_the_asylum_and_deportation-relevant_Lage_in_der_People_Republic_Bangladesch_% 28Stand_Mai_2019% 29% 2C_22.07.2019.pdf, accessed 19.3.2020

 FH - Freedom House (2020): Freedom in the World 2020 - Bangladesh,, accessed on April 1, 2020

 FIDH - International Federation for Human Rights (ed.) (29.12.2018): Joint statement on the undemocratic electoral environment in Bangladesh, on-the-undemocratic-electoral-environment-in, accessed on April 3, 2020

 ÖB - Austrian Embassy New Delhi (8th 2019): Asylum Country Report Bangladesh

4. Security agencies

Last change: April 6th, 2020

The police are based at the Ministry of the Interior and have a mandate to maintain internal security and law and order. The army, which reports to the Prime Minister's Office, is responsible for external security, but can also be used for domestic security tasks. Civilian agencies continued to have effective control over the armed forces and other security agencies. The government has mechanisms in place to investigate and punish abuse and corruption; however, they are not always used (USDOS 11.3.2020).

The work of the police is characterized by a lack of resources including inadequate infrastructure, lack of personnel, training and work materials, inefficiency and corruption (AA 07/27/2019). The government took steps to improve police professionalism, discipline, training and responsiveness, and to reduce corruption. (USDOS 3/11/2020). Despite these efforts, abuse of power and inappropriate use of force by security forces, in particular by the Rapid Action Batallions (RAPs), which subsequently remain unpunished (ÖB 8.2019).

There are indications of arbitrary arrests by the police, although prohibited by law, as well as arbitrary use of preventive arrests permitted by law. Arrest without giving a reason is permitted for up to 30 days to prevent acts that endanger the national security, defense, sovereignty, public order or economic interests of the country. The arrested have no right to a defense attorney. Those mainly affected are political party activists and NGO representatives who criticize the government. The in many cases disproportionately long pre-trial detention is still problematic. The reasons given for this are bureaucratic inefficiency, limited resources and corruption. It is currently assumed that there are over 2 million pending civil and criminal proceedings (ÖB 8.2019).

The security forces continue to routinely "disappear" (AI 30.1.2020; see also section 5). For fear of retaliation, those affected generally refrain from reporting members of the security authorities for human rights violations, so that they remain unpunished. Even in the event of a complaint, there is largely impunity. However, if the media publicly denounces police failures, the responsible police officers are often punished by the political level (AA 07/27/2019).

The main part of the security authorities consists of the "Bangladesh Police", which is subordinate to the Ministry of the Interior and has around 116,000 men. Additional units are available to support the police (ÖB 8.2019).

Rapid Action Batallions (RABs): There are around 12 RABs with a total of around 8,500 men who are also subordinate to the Ministry of the Interior. Your task is to fight against armed criminal organizations. The RABs are mainly stationed in urban centers, are mainly recruited from the police and the army, are well trained and equipped with modern equipment (ÖB 8.2019). Serious human rights violations such as extrajudicial killings are attributed to them (AA 07/27/2019). The RABs have adopted an aggressive strategy against armed “gang” members, resulting in numerous deaths from shootings. They are also used in demonstrations, with excessive violence, rubber bullets and live ammunition against demonstrators, who repeatedly claimed their lives. Despite numerous arrests, there has been no conviction for extrajudicial killings, torture or arbitrary arrests against members of the FAOA (ÖB 8.2019). The government continues to deny enforced disappearances, torture and other violations by security forces, as well as extrajudicial killings by members of the FAOA. Security forces have long tried to cover up unlawful killings by claiming deaths occurred in an exchange of fire or in the crossfire. Hundreds were allegedly killed in such "crossfire" (HRW 14.1.2020).

Bangladesh Ansar: Founded in 1948 and also subordinate to the Ministry of the Interior, there are currently around 23,000 lightly armed Ansars who are used to support the police in rural areas and also take on civil protection tasks (ÖB 8.2019).

Bangladesh Rifles (BDRs): This approximately 40,000-strong paramilitary force is subordinate to the Home Ministry, but is mainly led by army officers and serves primarily for border protection. The BDRs are also responsible for preventing smuggling and human trafficking (ÖB 8.2019).

Village Defense Parties (VDP): Founded in 1976, there should be a male and female “platoon” of 32 people in each village in the country, who support the police in maintaining peace and order and support the civil authorities with social issues and economic recovery programs and in the event of natural disasters. Similarly, in cities there are so-called Town Defense Parties (ÖB 8.2019).

The Special Branch of Police (SB) is tasked with ensuring national security, fulfills the function of collecting intelligence information and is entrusted with counter-espionage. The SB is represented everywhere in Bangladesh and has the ability to act inside and outside the country (AA 07/27/2019).


 AA - Foreign Office (Germany) (July 22, 2019): Foreign Office, report on the asylum and deportation-relevant situation in the People's Republic of Bangladesh, C3% A4rtiges_Amt% 2C_Bericht_% C3% Bcber_the_asylum_and_deportation-relevant_Lage_in_der_People_Republic_Bangladesch_% 28Stand_Mai_2019% 29% 2C_22.07.2019.pdf, accessed 19.3.2020

 HRW - Human Rights Watch (January 14, 2020): World Report 2020 - Bangladesh,, accessed on April 1, 2020

 ÖB - Austrian Embassy New Delhi (8th 2019): Asylum Country Report Bangladesh

 USDOS - US Department of State (March 11, 2020): Country Report on Human Rights Practices 2019 - Bangladesh,, accessed March 24, 2020

5. Corruption

Last change: April 6th, 2020

Corruption is widespread in Bangladesh and has penetrated all parts of society (AA July 27, 2019; see LIFOS February 25, 2019, ODHIKAR February 8, 2020). In 2019, Bangladesh ranked 146th out of 180 countries on the Transparency International corruption index (TI 23.1.2020). This means an improvement compared to 2018 (149th place among 180 countries examined) by three positions (compared to 2017: 143/180) (TI 29.1.2019).

Corruption is seen as a widespread problem, particularly in the area of ​​the courts of first instance, court clerks, public prosecutors, magistrates and lawyers. Wealthy people or those anchored in the big political parties have the option of the inefficient and corrupt judicial system. However, the extent of corruption ensures that victims of state persecution can also benefit from it (ÖB 8.2019).

The Criminal Code of 1860 prohibits civil servants from accepting bribes [Paragraph 161, 165] or aiding and abetting bribery [Paragraph 165 A] (TI 1.2019). The migration authorities, the police and the administration of justice are named as the most corrupt authorities. NGOs and the military enjoy the best reputation (AA 07/27/2019).

The Anti Corruption Commission (ACC) is an anti-corruption and legal protection instrument. However, the German embassy in Dhaka assesses this as a “rather toothless paper tiger” and “pure figurehead” (ÖB 8.2019). The Anti-Corruption Agency (ACC) can only indict officials suspected of corruption with the permission of the government. In fact, the "Anti Corruption Commission" is powerless (AA 07/27/2019; cf. ODHIKAR 02/08/2020). The government uses the ACC for politically motivated criminal prosecution, for example against the opposition BNP (FH 2020).

The recent governments have ambitions to curb corruption (LIFOS February 25, 2019) and the government is taking steps to combat widespread police corruption (USDOS March 11, 2020).


 AA - Foreign Office (Germany) (July 22, 2019): Foreign Office, report on the asylum and deportation-relevant situation in the People's Republic of Bangladesh, C3% A4rtiges_Amt% 2C_Bericht_% C3% Bcber_the_asylum_and_deportation-relevant_Lage_in_der_People_Republic_Bangladesch_% 28Stand_Mai_2019% 29% 2C_22.07.2019.pdf, accessed 19.3.2020

 FH - Freedom House (2020): Freedom in the World 2020 - Bangladesh,, accessed on April 1, 2020

 LIFOS - Center för landinformation och landanalys inom migrationsområdet (25.2.2019): Bangladesh falska handlingar,, accessed March 5, 2019

 ODHIKAR (8.2.2020): Annual Human Rights Report 2019; Bangladesh, February 8, 2020,, accessed on April 3, 2020

 ÖB - Austrian Embassy New Delhi (8th 2019): Asylum Country Report Bangladesh

 TI - Transparency International (January 23, 2020): Corruption Perceptions Index 2019,, accessed April 6, 2020

 TI - Transparency International (1.2019): Avoiding corruption in the clothing industry: Scenarios from Bangladesh,, accessed 6.4.2020

 TI - Transparency International (January 29, 2019): Corruption Perceptions Index 2018,,, access 6.3 .2019

 USDOS - US Department of State (March 11, 2020): Country Report on Human Rights Practices 2019 - Bangladesh,, accessed March 24, 2020

6. General human rights situation

Last change: April 6th, 2020

To date, Bangladesh has ratified, acceded to or accepted several UN human rights conventions (ÖB 8.2019; see UNHROHC, undated). The Constitution of Bangladesh in the since
The version applicable on May 17, 2004 lists in Part III, Articles 26 to 47A, a comprehensive catalog of fundamental rights. Article 102 of Part VI, Chapter 1 of the Constitution governs the enforcement of fundamental rights by the High Court Division of the Supreme Court. Anyone who feels that their basic constitutional rights have been violated has the direct route to the “High Court”. The "National Human Rights Commission" was set up in December 2007 under the "National Human Rights Commission Ordinance" of 2007, but has not yet developed any noteworthy activity (ÖB 8.2019).

In some cases, human rights violations take place with the tolerance and active participation of the police and other security forces (GIZ 11.2019a). These include extrajudicial killings, disappearances, arbitrary arrests and arrests, and torture (USDOS 3/11/2020). The government has recently arrested up to 2,000 RAB members for various offenses. Although the RABs have committed hundreds of killings or alleged murders in recent years, there has not yet been any conviction for extrajudicial killings, torture or arbitrary arrests (ÖB 8.2019, see also Section 5).

Human rights violations also include harsh and life-threatening conditions of detention, political prisoners, arbitrary or illegal invasion of privacy, censorship, blocking of websites and criminal defamation; significant obstacles to freedom of assembly and association, such as restrictive laws on non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and restrictions on the activities of NGOs; significant restrictions on freedom of movement; Restrictions on political participation as elections are not perceived as free or fair; Corruption, human trafficking; Violence against lesbian, homosexual, bisexual, transgender and intersex (LGBTI) people and criminalization of same-sex sexual activity; Restrictions on independent trade unions and workers' rights and the use of the worst forms of child labor (USDOS 3/11/2020).

The government of Bangladesh is ignoring recommendations regarding credible reports on electoral fraud, crackdown on freedom of speech, torture practices by security forces and increasing cases of forced disappearances and killings (EEAS 01/01/2019; see HRW 01/14/2020).

The law prohibits discrimination against people with disabilities and steps are being taken to enforce these provisions more effectively. Cases of discrimination and social violence against religious and ethnic minorities as well as against people based on their sexual orientation persist (USDOS 03/11/2020). The Information and Communication Technology Act (ICT Act) is used to prosecute members of the opposition and members of civil society for offenses of defamation (USDOS 03/11/2020).

Bangladesh continues to be an important feeder and transit point for victims of human trafficking. Tens of thousands of people are trafficked in Bangladesh every year. Women and children, both overseas and within the country, are trafficked for domestic bondage and sexual exploitation, while men are primarily trafficked for the purpose of work abroad. A comprehensive anti-trafficking law from 2013 protects victims and increases penalties for traffickers, but enforcement remains inadequate (FH 2020). International organizations claim that some border guards, military and police officers were involved in facilitating trafficking in Rohingya women and children. Forms of support for human trafficking range from “looking the other way” to accepting bribes for the traders' access to Rohingya in the camps to direct participation in trade (USDOS 11.3.2020).


 EEAS -

European External Action Service (1.1.2019):

Statement by the Spokesperson on parliamentary elections in Bangladesh,, accessed 6.4.2020

 FH - Freedom House (2020): Freedom in the World 2020 - Bangladesh,, accessed on April 1, 2020

 GIZ - German Society for International Cooperation GmbH (11.2019a): Bangladesh, Geschichte & Staat,, accessed on March 24, 2020

 HRW - Human Rights Watch (January 14, 2020): World Report 2020 - Bangladesh,, accessed on April 1, 2020

 HRW - Human Rights Watch (January 17, 2019): World Report 2019 - Bangladesh,, accessed on February 27, 2019, April 4, 2020

 ÖB - Austrian Embassy New Delhi (8th 2019): Asylum Country Report Bangladesh

 UNHROHC- United Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner (oD): View the ratification status by country or by treaty - Bangladesh, EN, accessed on March 5, 2019

 USDOS - US Department of State (March 11, 2020): Country Report on Human Rights Practices 2019 - Bangladesh,, accessed March 26, 2020

6.1. SOGI - Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity

Last change: April 6th, 2020

Homosexual acts are illegal and can be punished according to § 377 of the "Bangladesh Penal Code, 1860" (BPC) with life imprisonment (ILGA 3.2019), with a prison term of up to ten years, including the possibility of a fine (ILGA 3.2019; cf. AA 7/27/2019). The law is not being actively applied. No legal proceedings or convictions of homosexuals are known (ÖB 8.2019). Members of the LGBTI (homosexual, bisexual, transgender and intersex) community reported that the police used the law as a pretext to harass LGBTI people and feminine men, regardless of their sexual orientation (USDOS 3/11/2020; see AA July 27, 2019).

Homosexuality is absolutely frowned upon by society and is not openly lived by those affected. Where homosexuals are recognized as such, they face social discrimination and, in individual cases, abuse and even murder (ÖB 8.2019; cf. HRW 14.1.2020). Dozens of attacks on members of the LGBTI community are reported every year (FH 2020). In a report submitted by the Human Rights Forum Bangladesh (HRFB) to the UN Committee against Torture on June 29, 2019, a total of 434 complaints of harassment or ill-treatment were cited for the period 2013 to 2018. Of these, 294 cases concerned attacks against members of sexual minorities (HRFB June 22, 2019).

The “third sex”, the so-called “hijras”, eunuchs and people with underdeveloped or malformed sexual organs play a special role. Due to a long tradition on the Indian subcontinent, this group is present in the consciousness of society and practically established. However, this circumstance does not protect them from attacks and massive social discrimination (AA 07/27/2019), even if many Hijras live in clearly defined and organized communities that have survived for generations. Although they have a recognized role in Bangladeshi society, they nonetheless remain marginalized (DFAT August 22, 2019). The government failed to properly enforce the protection of the rights of Hijras (HRW 01/14/2020).

LGBT organizations, especially for lesbians, are rare (USDOS 3/11/2020). There is no NGO for sexual orientation and gender identity in Bangladesh, but there are NGOs like “Boys of Bangladesh”, the “Bhandu Social Welfare Society” and online communities like “Roopbaan”, the lesbian network “Shambhab” and “Vivid Rainbow” (ILGA 3.2019).


 AA - Foreign Office (Germany) (July 22, 2019): Foreign Office, report on the asylum and deportation-relevant situation in the People's Republic of Bangladesh, C3% A4rtiges_Amt% 2C_Bericht_% C3% Bcber_the_asylum_and_deportation-relevant_Lage_in_der_People_Republic_Bangladesch_% 28Stand_Mai_2019% 29% 2C_22.07.2019.pdf, accessed 19.3.2020

 DFAT - Australian Government - Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (August 22, 2019): DFAT Country Information Report Bangladesh, pdf, accessed April 6, 2020

 FH - Freedom House (2020): Freedom in the World 2020 - Bangladesh,, accessed on April 1, 2020

 HRW - Human Rights Watch (January 14, 2020): World Report 2020 - Bangladesh,, accessed on April 1, 2020

 HRFB - Human Rights Forum Bangladesh (22.6.2019): published by CAT - UN Committee Against Torture: Stakeholders' Submission to the United Nations Committee against Torture, /INT_CAT_CSS_BGD_35310_E.docx, accessed 6.4.2020

 ILGA - International Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Trans and Intersex Association (3.2019): State Sponsored Homophobia 2019 (Author: Mendos, Lucas Ramon), .pdf, accessed on April 6, 2020

 ÖB - Austrian Embassy New Delhi (8th 2019): Asylum Country Report Bangladesh

 USDOS - US Department of State (March 11, 2020): Country Report on Human Rights Practices 2019 - Bangladesh,, accessed March 26, 2020

7. Freedom of movement

Last change: April 6th, 2020

The freedom to move around in the country is relatively unrestricted (FH 2020; cf. AA 7/27/2019). There are no legal obstacles to settling in other parts of the country, with the exception of the Chittagong Hill Tracts. In fact, a large number of people migrate from the countryside to the cities every year (AA 07/27/2019). In principle, the government respects the rights of domestic and foreign freedom of movement, emigration and return of citizens, with the exception of the two sensitive regions of Chittagong Hill Tracts and Cox’s Bazar. In 2015, the government announced restrictions for foreign travelers to these areas, in which many unregistered Rohingyas live outside the two official refugee camps in the cities and villages, but the type of implementation was still unclear at the time (ÖB 8.2019).

There are no restrictions on entering or leaving the country (ÖB 8.2019; see FH 2020; AA July 27, 2019). However, people who have already lost their passport in the past are often only issued passports that are only valid for a few months. In general, there are sometimes enormous delays in the issuing of passports (ÖB 8.2019). Some opposition politicians also report long delays in renewing passports, as well as harassment and delays at airports (USDOS March 11, 2020). There is a travel ban for suspects of war crimes during the War of Independence in 1971 (ÖB 8.2019; see USDOS 11.3.2020).

Women do not need permission from their fathers or husbands to travel. Minors over the age of twelve do not need a legal representative to apply for a passport. You can also travel alone, but require a special form signed by one of the parents (ÖB 8.2019).

There is no state registration system or nationality register (ÖB 8.2019; see AA July 27, 2019). Newcomers stand out because of the lack of family ties and because of the close proximity to each other. This also places certain limits on anonymity in cities (AA 07/27/2019).


 AA - Foreign Office (Germany) (July 22, 2019): Foreign Office, report on the asylum and deportation-relevant situation in the People's Republic of Bangladesh, C3% A4rtiges_Amt% 2C_Bericht_% C3% Bcber_the_asylum_and_deportation-relevant_Lage_in_der_People_Republic_Bangladesch_% 28Stand_Mai_2019% 29% 2C_22.07.2019.pdf, accessed 19.3.2020

 FH - Freedom House (2020): Freedom in the World 2020 - Bangladesh,, accessed on April 1, 2020

 ÖB - Austrian Embassy New Delhi (8th 2019): Asylum Country Report Bangladesh